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1 With all the books and articles recently published on theAmericanization of Europe and
of business in general, and on the varieties of capitalism, reformulating questions and
organizing  intelligent,  new  responses  to  these  issues  is  difficult.  This  book  defies
expectations  by  boldly  attacking  some  old  issues,  formulating  new  ones,  while
incorporating a broad approach to business history. The editors have brought together a
group of scholars with extraordinary industry, national, andhistorical expertise. Many of
the essays reinterpret historical developments and raise interesting theoretical questions
without overburdening the text with non-historical,  social  science methodologies and
debates. Like most works of this kind, there is a fair variety in the quality of writing and
insight among the chapters. Nevertheless, the book goes a long way in filling gaps in
current  social  science  and  historical  thinking.  It  adds  a  cross-cultural  dimension  to
varieties of capitalism debates, as well as a business dimension in effortsto get away from
segmented  national  histories.  In  the  introduction,  the  editors  lay  out  a  clear,  but
multifaceted and comparative research agenda.
2 The book is divided into several parts. It begins with two excellent introductions. The
editors present an ambitious plan, one that is intended to look at the structural, strategic,
technological, social, and political dimensions of business, while integrating the overall
economic impact and firm specific returns generated by foreign investment. They begin
with a discussion of how the European experience,  with American direct investment,
challenges modernization and the logic of  industrialization theories,  notably those of
W.W. Rostow  and  A. Chandler.  Although  American  entry  helped  transform  European
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business, many European sectors were already modern and many kept some distinctive
European qualities. Understanding how Europeans adapted requires understanding not
only how they felt about American incursions and how those feelings evolved, but also
that American influences were not monolithic nor identical over time. Moreover, cultural
exchanges proceeded in two directions. American firms learned European lessons.
3 In contrast to the first chapter, the Wilkins contribution is focused on delineating the
different periods of American investment, their specific sectors, types and host country,
as well as the overall relationship that existed between the United States and Europe.
Already in  the  late  nineteenth-century,  European business  and American investment
there took on strategic importance for American companies, but its relative importance
shifted along with political and technological changes. Wilkins stresses that there were
many  important  contexts  for  these  investments.  The  amounts  and  types  of  U.S.
investments were not only shaped by technology and European attitudes about American
products and methods, but also by American attitudes about themselves and competitive
threats from other countries, particularly Japan. Wilkins gives several examples of how
American companies wrestled with the thorny issue of adaptation to foreign markets
while keeping the cost advantages of simply transferring know-how acquired at home
and standardizing  offerings  and methods.  She  concludes  by  raising  some interesting
theoretical issues, some addressed by the collection and some that might be developed by
future projects. These include whether outward investment is always a sign of strength
and inward investmenta sign of weakness; to what extent were American firms’ forces for
system convergence or  rather  co-opted by the foreign capitalist  systems where they
invested; and,  to  what  extent  did  U.S.  multinationals  in  Europe drive  growth in the
region.
4 The other sections group seven country studies, eight company or sector pieces, and,
finally, four chapters, which focus on how American companies dealt with various stages
of European integration. Although some effort was made to develop themes consistently,
the chapters differ greatly on the level of company specificity and sources. I will confine
my  detailed  comments  to  the  chapters  about  countries  and  sectors  about  which  I
ostensibly know something: Germany, France, and the pharmaceutical sector, in which I
worked for nearly ten years.
5 In  his  essay  about  U.S.  automobile  and  consumer  electronics  investment  in  France,
Patrick  Friedenson  reminds  us  that  not  all  American efforts  aremet  with  consistent
success. In contrast to many other European markets, strong U.S. companies in these
sectors failed to establish themselves as well as they did in several other countries of
comparable  size  and with formidable  domestic  competitors.  The bulk  of  the  chapter
systematically recounts the false starts and moderate successes of industry giants like
GM, Ford, and GE. He frames the chapter around a host of possible explanations ranging
from  company  error  to  French  political  resistance,  but  his  narrative  produces  no
convincing single explanation for all the cases nor individual ones. None of the companies
forged long-lasting ties with French companies nor could acquire French companies or
build up greenfield investments. His attempt to answer his original question about cause
might have been well-served by direct and detailed comparisons with U.S. investment in
these sectors in other countries, and by a better overview of all FDI in France and with it
something  about  the  experiences  of  other  countries  incursions  into  France.  Skilled
historian that he is,  Friedenson falls back in his conclusion on the combined roles of
culture, accident, path determinacy as well as the economic issues posed by the sectors’
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margins  and  France’s  successful  R&D  investments  in  electronic  and  automotive
innovation.
6 Although Susanne Hilger’s chapter has a different research agenda and covers a different
period and sector, the failures of American companies in France serve as a useful contrast
to her account of Proctor & Gamble’s market entry in Germany. Not only does she discuss
a different sector, Hilger derives her insights from a detailed examination of one of the
most  successful  consumer marketing companies  in the world.  But  whereas American
electronic  and  car  companies  began  to  come  to  France  with  many  technological
advantages and a vibrant home market, P&G arrived in Germany with little more than
marketing expertise and a stagnant home-market for the soap business. Hilger sets her
story against a short introduction to P&G history and the history of U.S. FDI in Germany
during the second half of the twentieth-century. Her discussion of the turbulence in U.S.
investment into Germany before World War II, the ambivalence of many Germans about
foreign investment and on how both might have conditioned P&G’s decisions in the 1950s
is very short.  But her account emphasizes the long-standing economic importance of
foreign  investment  to  the  German  economy,  and  the  impact  that  World  War II  and
occupation had on the configuration of German industry as well as the willingness to
accept foreign money. Like many American companies, P&G came to Germany in the
1960s as an antidote to a highly competitive U.S. market with few growth opportunities.
Although P&G timed its entry to coincide with the last days of Bretton Woods and a very
strong dollar on the eve of devaluation, an investment factor hardly acknowledged in the
collection, it faced many obstacles in Germany including strong competition, production
and  human  resource  problems,  and  market  regulation.  P&G’s  reputation  for  strong
marketing  skills  and  ruthless  competition  preceding  its  entry  were  greeted  with  a
mixture of awe and distain. Its success depended on balancing the exploitation of its
American strengths for TV and other advertising, for example, with German sensibilities.
Many of its television campaigns were well received for decades by German audiences.
After a tough start, the company expanded on its product offering, sales and profits in the
1970s. From 1971 to end of the century, it had increased sales sixteen fold and employees
over fourfold.
7 American companies played a very active role in one of Europe’s great growth sectors in
the  twentieth-century,  pharmaceuticals.  But  as  Viviane  Quirke  argues,  in  terms  of
European  entry,  the  U.S.  and  U.K.  pharmaceutical  companies  indeed  had  a  special
relationship. Because of a common language and early cross-border investment, in both
directions,  U.S.  companies  could  integrate  their  research  and  marketing  with  U.K.
companies  more seamlessly  than with continental  companies.  The science,  on which
research-based  companies  depended,  was  more  international  and  readily  exchanged
between British and Americans, leading to many joint undertakings. The relationships
may even have been deeper than Quirke indicates. The special relationship, for example,
often led to deeper management dependencies on U.K. staff  to handle even issues in
continental Europe. 
8 I have some regrets about the book. A complete bibliography for all the chapters would
have given readers an overview about what has already been written on the subject.
Although each piece contains serious footnoting, a centralized grouping of the literature
would have been helpful. More importantly, some key sectors like banking, insurance and
above  all  consulting  arehardly  present.  This  said,  the  collection  represents  a  very
thorough and thoughtful contribution to a very important area of business history.  I
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highly recommend it  to anyone interested in business and economic history,  foreign
investment, and cross-cultural development.
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